Past, Present and Future of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident

KOIDE Hiroaki

Abstract

A. Past: what happened on March 11, 2011

1. “Decay heat” melted the core
On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was hit by the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake. Magnitude of the earthquake was 9.0, whose energy was equivalent to 30,000 Hiroshima atomic bombs — huge power of nature far beyond human scale. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant stopped operation, which meant the fission chain reaction of uranium stopped. But this did not mean that heat generation in the reactors stopped; the fission products had been accumulated in the reactor during operation, and, because they are radioactive substances, they continue to discharge heat. The heat, called “decay heat”, reaches equivalent to 7% of the heat generated by an operating reactor. Today a standard power reactor with an electric output of 1,000 MWe produces a thermal output of 3,000 MWt, 7% of which is 210 MWt. The heat evaporates 350 liters of water (equivalent to two ordinary household bathtubs) every second. If the heat cannot be removed, the reactor core inevitably melts down. To remove the generated heat, i.e. to cool down the reactor, water as a coolant must be injected. To inject water, pumps must run. To run pumps, electricity is needed. The Fukushima Daiichi NPP, however, has stopped operation, loosing its capacity to self-supply with electricity. Under such situation, power supply from exterior had been envisaged. But exterior power lines had also been damaged with most of transmission towers shaken down by the huge seismic. The Fukushima Daiichi NPP lost external power supply, too. In such a peculiar case, necessary power was supposed to be assured by the startup of onsite emergency power generators. However, all the emergency generators in Unit 1 through 4 were submerged by a huge tsunami that struck about one hour after the seism. Thus Unit 1 through 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP were deprived of all the electricity supply — a total blackout. Every nuclear expert has long been fully aware that station blackout is the biggest cause of a catastrophic nuclear accident. It was precisely what happened. With no clue for the operators to what to do, Unit 1 through 3, which were in operation, melted down.

2. Unit 4 in periodic inspection
Unit 4 was undergoing periodic inspection this day, and all the fuel had been moved from the reactor to the spent fuel pool. Under the water of the pool, there were 1,331 assemblies of fuel that had experienced nuclear fission. They included 783 spent fuel assemblies that could no more be used as fuel, of which 548 were those from Unit 4 (the whole core). As radioactive materials decrease with the passage of time, so does the decay heat. Therefore, in comparison to the reactors suddenly encountering an accident while operating, Unit 4 luckily had a longer time of margin before the fuel in the spent fuel pool — whose calorific value was smaller — started to melt. Once melted, however, it should have caused a heavy contamination to the 250 km away Tokyo, as reported Shunsuke Kondo, then president of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Self-Defence Forces and Tokyo Fire Department desperately struggled to supply water into the spent fuel pool in Unit 4. The struggle itself did not exert effects, but an aerial concrete pump truck called “giraffe” finally prevented the fuel immersed at the bottom of the fuel pool from melting down.

3. Eruption of radioactive materials into environment and contamination of land
However, release of radioactive materials from melt-down Unit 1 through Units 3 was unpreventable. The total amount of noble gases and large amounts of highly volatile fission products such as iodine and cesium were released. Like at the time of the 1979 US Three Mile Island accident and the 1986 former Soviet Union Chernobyl accident, nobody ever thought this could happen, until all this really happened. The planned response measures entirely failed, the prediction and the measuring of the radioactive plume as well. Therefore, no accurate assessments of the exposure to the noble gases and iodine are possible. Fortunately for Japan, belonging to the temperate northern hemisphere, the prevailing westerlies carried major part of the released radioactive materials toward the Pacific Ocean. On the other side, however, this has led to great difficulties to estimate the amounts of released radioactive substances. According to the report the Japanese Government submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the amount of cesium 137 released into the atmosphere was 15 peta-becquerel (PBq) — 168 times the cesium 137 Hiroshima A-bomb sprinkled with its mushroom cloud. It is impossible to examine the relevance of this estimation, for most of the radioactive materials, including cesium, has flown into the Pacific Ocean, and thus cannot be measured. Some other evaluations are smaller, others larger. As for the cesiums fall-out onto the surface of the land of Japan, because of the long lives of its isotopes, it has become possible to grasp contamination by later studies. The amount of cesium-137 fallout on land, which has spread mainly in the Tohoku and the Kanto regions, was about 2.5 PBq. If converted to weight, it corresponds to about 750 g. Only this much cesium-137, sprinkled on the surface of land, has contaminated some 1,000 km2 of land at more than 600,000 Bq/m2 (together with cesium 134), uprooting more than 100 thousand local people. Around these regions spread about 14,000 square kilometers of land contaminated at more than 40,000 Bq/m2, which, under the Japanese law, must be specified as radiation controlled area. Properly speaking, the radiation controlled area is a place where the general public is kept out, and a radiation worker like myself is forbidden even to drink water, much more to live. In such areas, millions of people, including babies, are living abandoned by the government on the grounds that now is an emergency period.

B. Present: continuing exposure and hardship onsite and offsite

1. Harsh conditions : inaccessible scene of the accident
Now three years and eight months after the accident, the accident remains out of hand. No one ever knows what have become of the melted-down cores of Units 1, 2 and 3. This is because the scene is inaccessible. If it were a thermal power plant, it would be possible to go to the scene, examine where and how it is broken, to repair it, and eventually to resume operation afterwards. It is not the case when it comes to a nuclear power plant; human access to the scene of the accident means an instant death, robots are vulnerable to radiation... No one even knows when it will be possible to examine the site. Such a severe situation never occurs except in nuclear power plants.

2. Radioactive contaminated water continuing to accumulate with cooling water injection
On the ground that no further melt-down of the cores can be allowed, water has continuously been injected ever since the accident into the pressure vessels whose bottoms may have fallen out. In this way, however, the injected water inevitably becomes contaminated. Currently 400 tons of water is injected every day. The injected water would come through the holes into the containment vessels and would accumulate in the basement of the reactor buildings and the turbine buildings. These buildings are concrete structures and would presumably have cracks everywhere. Moreover, the underground is full of trenches and tunnels called pits for running piping and electrical wiring, which would also have fractures. Through these cracks and fractures, some 400 tons of groundwater would flow into the buildings every day and get mixed with the radioactive contaminated water. TEPCO is re-using 400 tons of the radioactive contaminated water daily by pumping it out from the basements of the turbine buildings and sending it through devices for capturing cesium, before re-injecting it into the reactor pressure vessel. However, the remaining 400 tons are accumulating every day. So far TEPCO has coped with this problem by storing accumulating contaminated water in makeshift tanks. However, the ever increasing storage tanks have developed leaks here and there. The total amount of stored radioactive contaminated water is already exceeding 400,000 tons. The remaining lots onsite for extension are expiring. This approach will breakdown before long.

3. Switching to a cooling method that does not use water
Basically, radioactive materials must not be in contact with water. This is why, when selecting sites for disposing spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste, the presence of groundwater is rigorously examined to find a site without the risk of exposure of the groundwater flow. Immediately after the accident, paramount was to prevent melt-down of the reactor cores. Therefore I myself made remarks that any water, even seawater or muddy water, should be injected toward reactor cores. However, currently, decay heat has reduced to several hundredths compared with immediately after the accident. So, measures should shift from water-cooling to, for example, metal cooling, liquid nitrogen-cooling, or air-cooling.

4. Underground seepage control walls and frozen soil walls
Once the contact of the ground water with the melted-down core occurs, it is no longer possible to prevent the spread of contamination. For this reason, at the time of May 2011, I made a statement that seepage control walls should be constructed underground around the basements of the reactor buildings. I also conveyed this statement to multiple politicians, hoping it to be realized. TEPCO, however, did not do it for the reason that such walls would cost 100 billion yen, and that it might prevent the company from tiding over the shareholders' meeting scheduled for June of that year. In 2013, the government and TEPCO finally acknowledged the need to construct underground seepage walls, but what they adopted was “frozen soil walls.” A technique for freezing a very limited portion of the soil to prevent the flood groundwater has been used in tunnel construction in the past. However, this time, what must be made is underground walls spanning the length of 1.4 kilometers and the depth of 30 meters. A priori, this cannot be done. Even if this reckless project should be realized, once the refrigerant ceased to circulate, the wall would collapse. To avoid this, required power must be secured any time. At the end of the day, TEPCO will be forced to create walls with concrete and steel. In any case, the construction work will require exposed works. On the other side, however, more wasteful works means more profit for general contractors.

5. Uncapturable tritium and unerasable captured radioactivity
TEPCO has tried to introduce a device called ALPS to capture radioactive materials other than cesium, but still it is not functioning properly. Even if ALPS functions, tritium passes through it. Furthermore, the captured radioactive materials cannot be erased. Their storage will be another future burden.

6. Transfer of fuel from Unit 4 spent fuel pool
The problem of spent fuel pool still persists. As already mentioned, on March 11, 2011, Unit 4 was undergoing periodic inspection, and all the fuel in the reactor core had been transferred to the spent fuel pool, avoiding the reactor core melt-down. However, an explosion occurred also in the Unit 4 building, partially destroying the reactor building. What is particular in the case of Unit 4, is that not only the reactor building top floor, but also the walls of the floor of the spent fuel pool embedded within, were blown by the explosion. Inside the spent fuel pool was present cesium 137 equivalent to some 14,000 Hiroshima atomic bombs. If the partially destroyed reactor building were to collapse in the next aftershock, exposing the stored fuel, a large amounts of radioactive materials would be released into the environment again. Aware of this crisis, TEPCO carried out seismic reinforcement work of the spent fuel pool immediately after the accident, and since November 2013 has finally started fishing the fuel from the spent fuel pool to transfer it to a shared fuel pool next to the unit. The 1,331 fuel assemblies are being finished transferring, leaving 55 as of October 2014. According to TEPCO's plan, all of the fuel is to be transferred by the end of 2014. We cannot but hope the work will be completed without incident. However, even if the fuel from Unit 4 spent fuel pool transfer is finished with no major incidents, spent fuel still remains in the pools in Units 1, 2, and 3. The reactor buildings they are in, are so heavily contaminated that workers cannot even approach the pools. So far, only such works as rubble removal around Unit 3 spent fuel pool have been carried out by the use of remote-controlled heavy equipment. No one knows for sure when the fuel can be transferred from the pools.

7. Impossible “decontamination” and management of collected radioactive materials
Needless to say, offsite contamination is also still there. The Japanese government calls “decontamination” such measures as the stripping of soil in the local people's living sphere. However, “decontamination” in the proper meaning of the word — neutralizing or removing dangerous substances —, is not possible with radioactive materials, because human beings cannot neutralize nor remove them. All we can do is move the contamination — this is why I call it “trans-contamination.” Even the trans-contamination can only be done in very limited locations. Mountains, forests and woods are untrans-contaminable. Even agricultural fields can be trans-contaminated in limited locations. Trans-contamination is only possible in residential areas and their vicinities. Naturally, it is better to do it than not to. But the radioactivity is never neutralized; such trans-contaminated materials as soil will now come accumulated as contaminants. FIBCs, containing these materials are heaping up everywhere. The Japanese government is intending to gather them in what they call interim storage facilities constructed in each prefecture. Once residents accept it, however, these “interim storages” will definitely become final disposal sites. Those that are contaminated beyond 8,000 Bq/kg are supposed to be managed as specified waste. The Government is intending to discard such waste by burying in the prefecture of origin or in highly contaminated areas such as Okuma-machi and Futaba-machi. This must not be done. The contaminant substances have their origin in the reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP which is a respectable property of TEPCO. TEPCO lied and sprinkled the substances over the lands of local inhabitants, who are now collecting them despite radiation exposure. The collected substances should be returned to TEPCO. However, it is not possible to return them to the premises of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, because at this present moment a number of workers are fighting with the radioactivity. About 15 km to the south of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, there is a vast site of Fukushima Daini NPP. TEPCO says it wants to restart it, but it must not be that a ringleader who thrust the local people down to the depths of hardship, should survive intact. The least worst option is collect all of the contaminants in the Fukushima Daini NPP, making it a nuclear garbage dump.

8. Health disorders
People are leading daily life under these harsh conditions in the contaminated regions. In the prefecture of Fukushima, thyroid survey has been carried out on some 300 thousand children so far, among whom more than 100 cancer cases have already been found. The Government promptly explains that the result is simply a screening effect and has nothing to do with the radioactive contamination caused by the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Since no extensive surveys have ever been conducted in this field, this is merely an unscientific predetermined conclusion. Further survey must be carried out.

C. Future: Long distant way to get the accident under control

1. Huge amount of radioactive materials
The accident of Fukushima Daiichi NPP is one of the most severe accidents mankind has ever encountered. Chernobyl NPP accident in the former Soviet Union was also a severe accident. But in this case it was a single reactor that broke down. While in the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, three reactors melted down. In the reactors, some 700 PBq of Cesium 137 had been present, of which 15 PBq was released into the atmosphere during about half a month after the accident, and presumably about the same amount flowed into the sea. TEPCO says it has captured some 200 PBq of cesium 137 from radioactive contaminated water in the reactor and the turbine buildings. However, nearly 500 PBq of cesium should be present in the proximity of the melted-down cores, or have already leaked in the basement. This is equivalent to 6,000 Hiroshima A-bombs. In addition, other radioactive substances, including strontium 90, have not even been captured. How can we prevent them to outflow to the environment — hard struggle continues.

2. Transfer of fuel from spent fuel pools in Units 1, 2 and 3
We must accomplish the transfer of fuel from the spent fuel pools of Unit 1 through 3 simultaneously, to places with least risk possible. However, as already mentioned, these spent fuel pools are in fiercely contaminated fields, so any work is accompanied by significant irradiation. But this can in no way be helped. It is not until this is accomplished — with a great deal of exposure — that we can start to think about what to do with the melted-down cores. No one knows how many years it will take.

3. Ardous work needed to take-out melt-down core
TEPCO and the Japanese government assume that melt-down cores would be piled up like buns just below the pressure vessels, the part they call pedestal. Since the accident they have always made optimistic outlooks, and have had repeated failures. If the melt-down reactor cores should remain inside the pedestals, the first thing to do would be repair the leaks in containment vessels, fill them with water, and then open up the bottoms of the pressure vessels. This might enable them to take out melt-down cores upwards. However, the melt-down cores may have already spread to outside the pedestals, or even penetrated down to the basements of the containment buildings, melting the bottom of the pedestals. In my view, recuperable melt-down core would be very limited despite all the hard work entailing exposure of workers.

4. Sarcophagi and endless fight
If so, the only option to take is give up the attempt of taking out the melt-down core now, and enclose the entire reactor buildings by sarcophagus. However, at Chernobyl, the initial sarcophagus has become crumbly and, 28 years after the accident, a second bigger sarcophagus covering the first sarcophagus is being constructed. If a sarcophagus is to be built to cover the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, no one can know how long it will take. Perhaps I will not live to see it completed. Those young generations who will see it, will have already been gone by the time a second sarcophagus will be constructed. So hard a thing is a nuclear power plant accident.

The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Politics of Uncertainty

Kyle CLEVELAND

Abstract

This presentation examines how risk was assessed by nuclear experts and state-level actors in both the Japanese government and foreign embassies in Japan and analyzes how technical assessments drove decision making and were implemented into radiological protective actions in the most dire phase of the Fukushima nuclear crisis. In addition to these state-level actors, the presentation addresses how radiation is conceived across a broader spectrum of groups affected by the disaster who are attempting to make sense of the cryptic, often contradictory information provided by the government, and who have, as a result, developed means of assessment outside mainstream institutions. Given the crisis of authority that the Fukushima disaster has engendered, citizen groups may provide a valuable counter-measure to official voices, providing what amounts to a regulatory function, by scrutinizing official data, assessing mainstream political discourse and offering supplementary information for the common good. Yet how, given the nebulous nature of radiation, and the range of variation in assessment protocols even among established authorities, can diverse groups reach a common understanding that can be translated into policy and change the political dynamic that continues to prevail in Japan’s post-Fukushima nuclear village? Based on intensive interviews, archival research of government documents, scrutiny of scholarly work on the crisis, and analysis of media coverage, this presentation will discuss how radiation assessment is culturally contextualized and negotiated in Japan and how this is conceived in public policy.

Realities Revealed About the First Three and a Half Years of the Ongoing TEPCO Nuclear Disaster

OSHIDORI Mako

Abstract

I have been attending TEPCO’s press conferences since 2011. I have continued to interview workers at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP), residents remaining in contaminated regions, and residents who evacuated to avoid contamination. I have also continued to collect information from public authorities such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, and the Prefecture of Fukushima. Is it possible to follow and chase vast and complicated issues that arise after a NPP accident? Will the product of all these investigations actually come out to the world through media reporting? — What I realized, after starting the interview and coverage activities, was that there was definite pressure placed on me not to report on the issues. This is no urban legend. In addition to voluntary restriction by the media, specific pressure came from Federation of Electric Power Companies, Electric Power Companies, and advertising agencies. Some of the reporters for major media outlets want to do fair and honest reporting, but the pressure often surpasses their efforts. Also, reporters assigned to the Tokyo Electric press conferences are rotated out every several months, resulting in reporters with a shallow knowledge base. Less and less information is coming out regarding Fukushima Daiichi NPP. If it weren’t for direct connections I have with workers on site, I would be fooled by all the lies blatantly and continuously released as announcements by Tokyo Electric.

One word expresses circumstances entailing a NPP accident: “unfairness.” Everything is unfair. Those affected are forced to live without information, knowledge, or options. However, it is a fact that 3 incidences of the level 7 nuclear accident happened. It is a mistake to just sit and wait for food to be placed in an open mouth. Rather than just blaming the media, the government, or just someone other than yourself, I suggest that you take action yourselves.

First, be inquisitive. There is no way inconvenient issues, such as information on a NPP accident, would be voluntarily released by the central government or corporations. Of course, it is quite regrettable that the media is on the side of authorities, not on the side of citizens! But there is no time to complain, so I am going to talk about how to gather post-NPP accident information, why we need to become wiser, and what is currently going on with Fukushima Daiichi NPP.

When I covered the 2012 OECD/NEA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency) meeting, scientists from various nations said, “Residents have no knowledge, so there is no need to offer detailed explanation about radiation protection. All that is needed is for experts to say it is safe.” I was truly disappointed and chagrined by this statement! We are being treated with contempt (or made monkeys of)!

Nuclear Plant Workers and the Hermeneutics of Low-Doses

Paul JOBIN

Abstract

Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the epidemiological surveys on the cohorts of workers employed in nuclear facilities have been only one but fascinating part of the long controversy on “low-doses”. The events of March 2011 have created a new context that could lead to the further modification of current standards of radiation protection. But the nuclear establishment has been deploying tremendous efforts to stop that possibility.

I will focus here on how Japanese labor and environmental activists build their criticism of existing safety standards by borrowing from classical epidemiology. I will further address the criticism on minor mode that has risen within the nuclear establishment (the “nuclear village”) in Japan and among the international “community” of epidemiologists and radiation specialists. The conflicts of interpretation (i.e. hermeneutics) between Japanese government experts and activists thus reflect a larger debate, at a global level, within the community of epidemiologists and radiation specialists.

This research follows up on a study I started in 2002 on Japanese nuclear contract workers. Further observation and interviews have been conducted since 3.11 in Japan and in Europe, among cleanup workers, government experts, activists and epidemiologists.

Nuclear discourses ―Analysing nuclear discourses after the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident―

KAGEURA Kyo

Abstract

Both languages and laws -- a higher order construct than languages -- deontically bind our behaviour as social reality. For instance, if one trespasses into a house and the owner of the house shouts "Thief!", the trespasser will most likely run away (to borrow an example from Dr. Katuhito Iwai). This demonstrates the deontic aspect of language. Our social environment is formed on the basis of this deontic nature of social realities, and reasonably functioning relationships between languages and realities as well as between individuals is based on this. Incidentally, that languages and laws are social realities means that individuals cannot unilaterally change them (for instance, people would not understand or go along with you if you suddenly decided to change the world for "table" to "nthelos"), but there is also a possibility that this deontic nature can be lost if a society at large moves in a certain direction.

Individual utterances make sense and attain social effect on the basis of this deontic aspect of language, but they may not necessarily be consistent with laws or common social understanding (for instance, criminal intimidation is classified as a crime because on the one hand utterances have in themselves an actual effect comparable to physical acts and on the other hand are judged as improper with respect to legal prescriptions). It should also be emphasised that utterances have binding effects not only in terms of their content but also in terms of the very fact that the utterances are made.

Taking this nature of languages and laws as a background, I will examine what sort of effects the utterances made by so-called "experts" and/or government officials and distributed by the media about the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident have had, by looking at some representative utterances. In so doing, I will clarify:
(a) the effect the utterances have had on the relationship between the utterer and the recipients;
(b) the effect the act of raising questions has had on the agenda and framework of discussion and the arrangement of discourse;
(c) the effect the content of the utterances has had.
I will also examine what sort of effect they have had en masse on the deontic aspect of languages and laws. If time permits, I will also address issues related to ongoing "risk communication" campaigns initiated by governments and related actors.

Some may question the value of this type of analysis, as the situation is now well beyond the stage at which it could be of immediate practical use. For example, the Japanese prime minister has declared to the world that "the contaminated water [from the damaged nuclear plant] was fully blocked" and "the nuclear situation is under control", and a so-called "expert" has proclaimed that "animal experiments have proved that radiation affects worried people and not cheerful people". This clearly demonstrates that the minimum deontic power of languages and laws needed to maintain a reasonable society has already been lost in Japan. Further evidence of this state of affairs can be seen in the way mainstream media has reacted to the Japanese cabinet's decision to unilaterally revise the established interpretation of the Japanese constitution and approve "collective defence". The cabinet does not have the legal right to change the constitution by cabinet decision, but this has not been used as a baseline by the media in reporting on this issue; rather, they have gone along with the government in treating the decision as having legal effect.

Despite --- or precisely because of --- this situation, rational analysis of utterances remains of utmost importance, given that having and showing the will to maintain the binding power of languages and laws is in itself a way to resist and counter the meltdown of languages and laws as social realities. I apologise that this abstract remains indicative rather than informative.

The rights of people affected by the nuclear accident

Anand GROVER

Video message

Good morning/Konnichiwa ladies and gentlemen,
I thank you for inviting me to speak at this symposium. I apologize for my absence from the event. However I would like to take this opportunity to speak, once again, in favour of the rights of persons who have been directly or indirectly adversely affected by the nuclear disaster of March 2011.

Almost exactly two years back I was in Japan on the mission as the Special Rapporteur. Later I presented my findings on the nuclear disaster in the official country report to the Human Rights Council.

The report very clearly states the position in science, which is reflected in my report, that there is a risk of cancer regardless of the amount of ionizing radiation a person is exposed to, in other words there is no low dose threshold of ionizing radiation which can be said to be safe. It has been my position that in assessing the immediate and long term health effects of the radiation, international organizations and the government have not taken into consideration lessons learned from Chernobyl. The population affected by Chernobyl has still not recovered from the health effects as well as social and economic effects brought about by it.

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), a committee set up by the UN with the mandate to assess and report levels and effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, has stated that for the population affected by the accident, cancer rates are expected to remain stable.

The committee’s other findings on health effects of radiation are that there is only a theoretical increased risk of thyroid cancer among most exposed children; no impact on birth defects/hereditary effects; and no discernible increase in cancer rates for workers.

The Japanese government has largely supported the committee’s findings. However quite a few people I met in Japan, including some scientists are opposed to this stand.

I will confine myself the topic of the session and talk about the rights of people affected by the nuclear accident.

The right to health includes the right to physical and mental health but it must not be understood that is only the right to healthcare. It is not an isolated right but brings within its folds underlying determinants of health such as food, housing, clean water, healthy environment etc. It is also informed by other rights such as the right to information, non-discrimination, participation etc. Further, it must be remembered that at all times, and regardless of whether the State has the means, the rights of vulnerable groups such as the elderly, children and persons with disability must be respected, protected and fulfilled. The moment the State fails to ensure any of these underlying determinants or rights it may have breached the right to health of affected individuals.

Regardless of the science involved, following the Tsunami and the nuclear disaster there have been many violations of the rights of people, including the right to health. Further, the immediate and long term effect of the accident on people’s life and health and on the enjoyment of their rights is evident.

The sudden and unplanned displacement of people, confusion among the highest levels of the government and the inability of authorities to provide information has caused preventable and lasting harm to people. For certain groups the effect of the accident was magnified. The elderly and persons with disability, who require assistance, were left to their own means. Children were and continue to be at risk of thyroid cancer. Nuclear power plant workers, often poor and homeless, were exposed to high levels of radiation were, and continue to be, denied quality healthcare. Separation of families, constant concern for children, threat of impending health effects, lack of health facilities goods and services, and loss of livelihood has created a climate of fear and anxiety, affecting the mental wellbeing of all those involved.

It is my understanding that the acute lack of preparedness of the government of Japan in dealing with this situation could have been avoided. In my view, the lack of preparedness of the government was closely connected with the lack of participation of people in policy decisions. All the plans and decisions related to the power plant and emergency measures were taken without meaningful participation of the people. This is a major issue in Japan, as participation is understood in Japan as representation through elected representatives.

However participation is not limited to an elected person representing people’s interests. It is the partaking of individuals who are likely to be affected or are affected by a government policy, at all stages of policy making, from formulation, decision making to implementation and monitoring. For instance, in the context of the power plant in Fukushima, the State should have ensured that individuals living around the plant were provided all the information necessary for them to decide whether they wanted the plant in the first place. Had people been involved in designing the emergency measures, it is likely that persons with disability would have been able to be access the shelters and remained safe. Involvement in the implementation of the disaster management policy would have ensured that people would have known the steps to be taken, including consuming iodine, preventing thus all the confusion and unnecessary exposure to radiation.

Access to information is another very important right and an aspect of the right to health. People must have access to all the information they need to make informed choices. By not making public the information regarding the radiation dose in the days following the accident, the State violated the right of people to make choices regarding their life. With this information, individuals would have been able to protect themselves from radiation exposure.

Months after the disaster, the government decided to put in place a plan for the resettlement of people in areas with ‘safe’ doses of radiation. This policy of resettlement doesn’t give people a real choice in the matter. Compensation to people who are not in favour of returning is much less than those who will be returning. Those in need of money may end up returning even if they don’t feel safe only for the money. The government has stated that these areas are safe and there would be no harmful effects of radiation. However, as there are two opposing understandings of the issue of radiation, the government should have provided people with a real choice by providing compensation to people regardless of the place they resided in. A forced option such as this is an affront to the dignity of people.

Finally, the government’s actions are largely based on the advice of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). The ICRP recommendations were based on the principles of optimisation and justification, according to which all actions of the Government should be based on maximizing good over harm. Such a risk-benefit analysis, that is what is best for the majority, is not in consonance with the right to health framework, as it gives precedence to collective interests over individual rights. Under the right to health, the right of every individual has to be protected. Thus even if one individual is adversely affected, her/his rights must be respected and protected.

These are but a few instances I have given which have infringed basic rights of the people and have violated their right to live a life with dignity.

If only the government had been inclusive, participatory and transparent in its policies and had not turned a blind eye to TEPCO’s lack of safeguards, these blatant violations could have been averted.

I must emphasize at this point that the national and international discourse on the issue is still largely dominated by experts or people like me who are far removed from the accident. It is the affected people who must time and again take up this fight and lead the dialogue domestically and internationally.

Thank you/Arigatou.

Behind-the-Scenes Stories Surrounding the Establishment of the Nuclear Accident Child Victims’ Support Law

TANIOKA Kuniko

Abstract

Shock of the nuclear power plant accident

• Before the occurrence of the Fukushima accident, the so-called “Safety myth” was prevalent. We were therefore not prepared for such an accident, and our reactions were extremely unorganized. No laws or acts were available to take countermeasures, from crippled-reactor handling to food regulations. The accident-dealing project team of the Democratic Party of Japan, then administration party, needed to take all possible measures at full speed, including information collection from the accident site, from around the nation and from overseas, discussion of countermeasures, and creating required laws.
• Because they had fostered the safety myth, the Japanese Government (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and local governments were eager to downplay the impact of the accident, using the term “panic prevention” as an excuse.
• Many Diet members, who had doubted the safety of nuclear power generation but had not been positive about speaking up, felt regret and remorse, that motivated them to start looking for ways of relieving victims and to create required laws, across the boundaries of political parties, including the ruling party and opposition parties.

“Chernobyl law” and philosophy behind the legislation of the Nuclear Accident Child Victims’ Support Law

• We inconsiderately believed that human rights were treated relatively lightly in the former Soviet Union nations. However, the Chernobyl law was established there after the accident, and served as a basis for supporting the victims. I was greatly surprised to learn of this, because the actions by the Japanese government in response to the Fukushima accident were just following old tracks. I acutely felt the necessity of a Japanese version of the Chernobyl law.
• Before the restart of schools in the affected areas, we had heard that the upper limit of the air dose rate where schools could be opened would be determined to be 10 mSv/year, based on the proposal by Dr. Madarame, the then chairperson of the Nuclear Safety Commission. However, the publicly announced upper air dose rate limit was 20 mSv/year. I assumed that the overnight doubling of the limit dose was because of strong pressure from the nuclear power lobby.
• I regarded that the right to access to information and the right to self-determination (freedom of choice), both of which are stated in the Chernobyl law and were adopted as the basic philosophies of the governmental support of the accident victims, would restore the sovereignty of those who had lost the right to learn of the seriousness of the reality and those who had lost the right of self-determination (right to pursue their own happiness) as a result of the demarcations established without their agreement.

Philosophy versus political and administrative reality

• From the beginning, the legislative drafting by the then ruling Democratic Party was intended to be acceptable for the opposition parties. The principal objective of the ruling party’s project team was to design a tree-like legislative structure in which each party’s claims were conjugated like branches.
• The legislation drafting was joined by citizens’ networks and Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in Japan, as well as by accident victims, realizing a comprehensive draft. Staff at the legislative bureaux of the Diet cooperated with us enthusiastically in spite of an extremely busy schedule.
• Negotiations with some opposition parties were difficult. What the parties were saying was different from what they were really thinking. We also heard of interfering statements. However, other opposition parties were cooperative, and we succeeded in drafting a single bill. To clarify the points of the bill, we organized question-and-answer sessions at Diet committees.
• Negotiations with the Government (more specifically, bureaucrats) were extremely difficult. We agreed to omit some specific numerical values, because otherwise we could not have reached an agreement. Negotiation over Article 13 was also extremely tough.

(Past, today, and tomorrow)

• As I recollect, at that time we could not have had a better law than the one we have today. Under today’s government, it could have been worse. We managed to establish the law by using an extremely rare opportunity.
• According to the spirit of the law (the wording of the law), the government must prove that “radioactive substances are not the causes of thyroid cancer and other diseases.”
• It is regrettable that public interest is low concerning some radionuclides, such as strontium and plutonium.
• It is sad that under the present circumstances, victims themselves may become complicit in victimizing others. The right to self-determination is not the right to place pressure on other people to do as one does.
• Realistic and constructive strategies and their implementation are needed.

Children of Fukushima Prefecture: No Protection Provided Against Radioactive Substances

SHISHIDO Toshinori

Abstract

In regards to the nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, numerous critical issues have not even been publicly addressed in the past three and a half years.

I was a teacher at a prefectural high school in Fukushima City when the NPP accident occurred in March 2011. How the schools dealt with the NPP accident is completely different from what TV or newspapers have reported. Teachers were practically prohibited to encourage students to take measures to reduce their own radiation exposure or to contrive ways to reduce radiation exposure to the students. Moreover, restrictions have been placed on talking about the NPP accident in school

Ever since the accident, children have not received protection from radioactive substances. Children are not allowed to express their will to protect themselves from radiation exposure. Children are not permitted to protect themselves from health effects from the NPP accident authenticated by laws and governmental regulations.

Fukushima Prefecture is divided into three regions: Hamadori (coastal), Nakadori (central), and Aizu (inland). An integrated view/concept of the entire prefecture as one entity has never been instilled in Fukushima residents.

Most of elementary and junior high schools in Fukushima Prefecture are established and operated by municipalities. In these municipally-run schools, opinions of local residents and parents/guardians are easily reflected, which made it possible to encourage students to wear masks, long-sleeved tops and long pants on the way to and from school. On the other hand, as most high schools in Fukushima Prefecture are operated by the prefecture, they just adhered to the policies of the prefectural government, without asking for any input from parents/guardians.

Immediately after the accident, the central government designated the evacuation zone, expanding it from the initial 3-km zone to the 10-km zone, and the 20-km zone, but most areas in the evacuation zone were, with a few exception, all located in Hamadori. Fukushima prefectural government officials as well as heads of municipal governments were highly dissatisfied with and harbored antipathy to the evacuation orders given without prior agreements or notifications. Municipalities in Nakadori and Aizu regions had to self-appoint themselves as the recipients of evacuees, never having an opportunity to evacuate or take protective measures themselves.

After the explosion of Fukushima Daiichi NPP Unit 1, newspaper and television reporters evacuated from Hamadori, following the instructions of their head offices. However, this evacuation of mass media has never been reported, even now, within Fukushima Prefecture. Local newspaper companies as well as TV and radio stations have never publicly admitted to Fukushima residents regarding the evacuation of their employees. Nevertheless, Iwaki and Minamisoma residents are certainly aware of this, as they witnessed the disappearance of the mass media from their towns.

On March 13, the day after the Unit 1 explosion, TV, radio and newspapers already began repeating slogans such as, “kizuna (ties),” “fukko (reconstruction/recovery),” and “gambaro (Let’s do our best!) ,” within Fukushima Prefecture.

On March 14, the Fukushima prefectural government decided to hold a public announcement of the successful applicants for entrance into prefectural high schools in Nakadori and Aizu region on March 16. Ignoring the large-scale expansion of radioactive contamination which happened on March 15, the prefectural government did not retract the decision, despite the radioactive contamination exceeding 20 μSv/h reached and enveloped Fukushima City. Fukushima prefectural high schools normally hold the public announcement of the successful applicants outdoors. (Note: ID numbers of successful applicants are publicly displayed outdoors on the school premise, and those who are admitted are required to file paperwork on the spot, necessitating the physical presence at the public announcement). The announcement was carried out, without any warning regarding radiation, causing all those who showed up—students who took the examination; their parent, guardians, and families; students who were recruiting prospective new students to various after-school clubs; and school teachers and employees—to be exposed to rain and snow containing radioactive substances. Incidentally, radiation measurements were never taken in regards to the radiation exposure of March 16, 2011.

“Experts” who came to Fukushima Prefecture around this time said, one after another, “Annual exposure up to 100 mSv has no health effects. There is no problem with leading a normal everyday life beyond the 30-km zone around the NPP, where the central government has not released any directives. As a result of this accident, exposure to radioactive iodine may possibly result in a very small increase in pediatric thyroid cancer cases, but there will be no other health effects expected. After the Chernobyl accident, other than the deaths of about 30 cleanup workers, or liquidators, the only effect observed was a small increase in pediatric thyroid cancer cases over 5 years after the accident. Pediatric thyroid cancer can be treated with simple surgeries and does not lower QOL (quality of life). What happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the atomic bombs killed a large number of people due to radiation exposure, has already confirmed that radiation exposure does not cause genetic effects. These constitute common scientific knowledge shared worldwide, and those who talk about the possibility of health effects beyond these are fear mongering.”

At the end of March 2011, outdoor activities resumed at prefectural high schools. Due to the lack of official restrictions or warnings, other than Shunichi Yamashita’s “100 mSv annually is safe,” the only thing that could have happened was for coaches and teachers to voluntarily instruct students on protective measures. As such, there were many instances where coaches and teachers took no protective measures, consequently exposing high school students to radiation.

During the hearing by the Cabinet-established Investigation Committee on the Accident, Senior Vice Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology at the time referred to “enforcing strict adherence to the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle at educational sites.” However, this instruction was never communicated to me while working at high school before my retirement in July 2011.

In April 2011, classes resumed at elementary, junior high and high schools in Nakadori and Aizu region, before the safety of school facilities and school routes was confirmed. In response to strong requests by parents/guardians, elementary and junior high schools implemented pro forma protection measures against radioactive substances for school routes and outdoor activities. In high schools, physical exercise classes were not held outdoors for a while, but students were not even encouraged to wear masks on the way to and from school. In 2011, all schools but one refrained from holding outdoor swimming classes. However, this was not intended so much to prevent radiation exposure for children but as to circumvent the potential damage compensation claims by residents living downstream for contamination.

In Fukushima Prefecture, outdoor practice and games were held for extracurricular physical activities (such as intramural sports) even in 2011. However, local media in Fukushima Prefecture failed to report on the topic of radiation exposure prevention in such circumstances, and the school officials declined interviews. After some groups, exceptionally adopting preventive measures, were interviewed, a misunderstanding spread that schools and athletic leagues were actually taking preventive measures against radiation exposure. This misunderstanding has also been taken advantage of by the Fukushima prefectural government.

Understanding the general picture of issues concerning people evacuating across wide areas, and evacuation whitepaper production project

MATSUDA Yoko

Abstract

The state where a person evacuates for some reason from his/her place of residence hit by a disaster to a place beyond the boundaries of his/her prefecture or municipality, is called wide-area evacuation (the evacuation beyond the prefectural boundary may also be called trans-prefectural evacuation.) In Japan, the issue of wide-area evacuation began to be touted about after the Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake (1995), when Hyogo Prefecture, which was severely struck by the earthquake, implemented measures to help trans-prefectural evacuees return to the prefecture. The wide-area evacuees of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake are located nationwide; their current residences are estimated to spread over some 1,200 municipalities in 47 prefectures. Like the dwellers of “deemed temporary housing,” (normal rental houses considered to be equivalent to temporary housing) the wide-area evacuees suffer from various difficulties such as that in accessing support and information intended for evacuees because they live far away from the disaster-struck areas.

Those who were obliged to evacuate out of the prefectures they had lived in are confronted with various difficulties, such as uncertainty about their future lives, family separation, lost opportunities of receiving public services and finding jobs, and generation gaps concerning whether or not returning to their hometowns. Because community members are scattered all over the nation, it is virtually impossible for them to put their opinions together and agree upon how to restore hometown communities, though opportunities such as explanatory gatherings and workshops are afforded. To eliminate such a dislocated situation in which wide-area evacuees are placed, and furthermore to be prepared for other possible gigantic disasters that may severely damage big cities possibly forcing people to evacuate in more varied patterns than after the 2011 earthquake, it is an urgent task to analyze the problem of wide-area evacuation and to develop countermeasures.

A fundamental characteristic of the problem is that the whole picture of wide-area evacuees remains unknown. The public information source on the number of evacuees is the National Evacuee Information System, administered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The registration with the system is optional. When evacuees register themselves, the administrative and supportive information offered from the municipalities they used to live are transferred to them. The number of “evacuees” registered on this system is about 290,000 nationwide. This figure includes about 65,000 trans-prefectural evacuees, which consists of about 52,000 from Fukushima, 8,000 from Miyagi, and 1,600 from Iwate prefectures. Chances are, however, that only part of the evacuees have registered with the system and that the registered evacuee data is not accurate. For those who evacuated voluntarily, registering with the system means that their official residence remain in the municipalities of their origins, which may cause them to confront various disadvantages in life, such as discrimination and job-finding difficulties. This is why many of them have decided to move out officially instead of remaining evacuees. This makes it more difficult to get hold of these people. Some families that have moved out from the Tohoku region to other areas regard themselves as settlers, not evacuees, and do not seek particular support as evacuees (there are also those who prefer not to be known as settlers from Tohoku). Nevertheless, the problem resides less in the ambiguity of the classification itself of those who left the Tohoku prefectures than in the fact that the ambiguity is burying the existence of the evacuees who are experiencing hardship but have limited accessibility to support. Because the whole picture of evacuees is unknown, it is difficult to plan support programs in both public and private sectors as well as to establish governmental or municipal policies.

In this presentation, I would like to summarize current problems concerning the issue of wide-area evacuation after the Great East Japan Earthquake, and also to introduce the project of editing Whitepaper of Evacuation after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident, to overcome these problems.

IPPNW's Critical Analysis of the 2014 UNSCEAR Report on Fukushima

Alex ROSEN

Abstract

This year, physicians from 19 affiliates of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) have published a critical analysis of the Fukushima report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).

The UNSCEAR report rightly states that the Fukushima nuclear disaster was not a singular event, but is an ongoing catastrophe; that it is not confined to Fukushima Prefecture, but affects people all over Japan and beyond; and that it constitutes the largest single radioactive contamination of the ocean ever recorded. Based on the collective lifetime doses of the Japanese population, which are presented in the report, it must be expected that about 1,000 excess cases of thyroid cancer and between 4,300 and 16,800 other excess cancer cases will occur in Japan due to Fukushima radioactive fallout.

It must be said, however, that predictions can only be as good as the presumptions and data they are based on. In its report, UNSCEAR attempts to downplay the true extent of the catastrophe. Its conclusions must be viewed as systematic underestimations for the following reasons:

1. The validity of UNSCEAR's source term estimates is in doub
2. There are serious concerns regarding the calculations of internal radiatio
3. The dose assessments of the Fukushima workers cannot be relied upon
4. The UNSCEAR report ignores the effects of fallout on the non-human biota
5. The special vulnerability of the embryo to radiation is not taken into account
6. Non-cancer diseases and hereditary effects were ignored by UNSCEAR
7. Comparisons of nuclear fallout with background radiation are misleadin
8. UNSCEAR'S interpretations of the findings are questionable
9. The protective measures taken by the authorities are misrepresented
10. Conclusions from collective dose estimations are not presented

As physicians, primarily concerned with the health of the people affected by the nuclear disaster, we have urged the United Nations General Assembly and the government of Japan to realize that the affected population needs protection from further radiation exposure. In our opinion, the following issues need to be addressed:

• All available expertise should be used for the tremendous tasks of minimizing ongoing radioactive emissions from the damaged reactors and spent fuel pools and preventing larger emissions in the future.
• According to UNSCEAR, more than 24,000 workers have worked on the premises of the crippled reactors since the start of the disaster. Tens of thousands more will be required over many decades. In addition to the provision of adequate radiation protection, monitoring and health care for these workers, a national lifetime radiation exposure register for all workers in the nuclear industry is required in Japan. This must include subcontractors as well as utility employees. Individual workers should have ready access to their results.
• The issue of functioning registries is also important for the civilian population. Currently, the absence of both effective cancer registries in most prefectures in Japan and comprehensive registers of exposed persons with dose estimates that can be used to assess long term health outcomes means that potential impacts will go undetected. Such registries should be created so that future health effects of the radioactive contamination can be properly assessed.
• It is unacceptable that people are currently being encouraged to return to some areas where they can be expected to receive up to 20 mSv in additional annual radiation exposure. We see no adequate alternative to minimize such unacceptable exposures other than more relocations than have currently occurred. Logistic and financial support for families living in the radioactively affected municipalities who want to move to less contaminated regions should be offered to reduce the risk of future health effects. Evacuees should not be pressured or bribed into returning to contaminated regions.
• Decontamination on the scale that would be required to sufficiently and sustainably reduce radiation exposures has not proven feasible. Also, radioactive contamination knows no boundaries, and fallout has not been confined to Fukushima Prefecture alone. Parts of Tochigi, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba have also been contaminated. At present, government programs responding to the nuclear disaster are largely limited to Fukushima Prefecture. A national approach based on contamination levels, not prefectural boundaries is needed.

The people of Fukushima are not being helped by false claims and premature reassurances that no health effects are to be expected. They need proper information, health monitoring, support and most of all, they need acknowledgment of their right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well being. This should be the guiding principle in evaluating the health effects of the nuclear catastrophe, not industrial interests or political gains.

Proof of Health Effects with Unconventional Epidemiological Methods: Report from Germany

Sebastian PFLUGBEIL

Abstract

Whether health effects can be expected after Fukushima nuclear catastrophe has been a controversial topic. In regards to this controversy, the analysis by Hagen Scherb, et al. from Helmholtz Zentrum München Institute of Computational Biology in Neuherberg is extremely important. Scherb developed a method to analyze stepwise changes in trend in statistical data series. Scherb confirmed these stepwise changes in trend in the following circumstances: the post-Chernobyl western Europe; in United States and Europe after the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons; in the vicinity of nuclear power plants in Germany, Switzerland and France; and near the interim storage unit for radioactive waste in Gorleben, Germany. Analyses by Scherb et al. can show, from publicly available data, some changes even in areas with small additional radiation exposure. This analytical method opens up a new understanding of radiation risk.

Analysis of Thyroid Cancer in Fukushima Children Ages 18 and Younger, and Future Tasks

TSUDA Toshihide

Abstract

Fukushima Prefecture has conducted a three-year screening program, with thyroid ultrasound sonography, in all residents whose ages were 18 and younger as of March 11, 2011. First year's screening (until March 31, 2012: “FY 2011” hereafter) targeted residents of municipalities nearest Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) where the significant portion of them evacuated after the accident. Second year's screening (until March 31, 2013: “FY 2012” hereafter) targeted residents of municipalities (many in “Nakadori*”) at a moderate distance (i.e. 40-80 km) from FDNPP. Third year's screening (until March 31, 2014: “FY 2013” hereafter) targeted residents of the remaining municipalities such as Iwaki City (43 km southeast of FDNPP), Soma City (43 km northeast of FDNPP), and Aizuwakamatsu City (98 km west of FDNPP). Screening is presumably conducted in the municipalities with the highest air dose rate and proceeding in the decreasing order of the air dose rate. The first round of screening completed at the end of FY 2013 (at the end of March 2014), covering the entire Fukushima Prefecture. From the fourth year on, screening is repeated every two years, with the first year covering the municipalities nearest FDNPP and Nakadori, and the second year the remaining municipalities. This year it is being conducted in the nearest municipalities and Nakadori.

This screening consists of the primary examination utilizing ultrasound sonography, targeting all residents 18 or younger, and the secondary examination targeting those who had cystic shadows 20.1 mm or larger or nodular shadows 5.1 mm or larger detected by ultrasound (smaller lesions could be eligible if deemed necessary) during the primary examination. These subjects are followed up and undergo other procedures such as cytological examination after fine needle aspiration (FNAC) and surgical operation. The results of the screening examination began drawing attention on February 13, 2013, when it was announced that there were 10 FNAC-positive cases (cases suspected of cancer: cases which had cancer cells detected, 3 of them already had surgery and were confirmed to have cancer after histological diagnosis) from the FY 2011 targeted areas adjacent to FDNPP. Since then, the screening examination results have been released about every 3 months (4 times a year), and the results are publicized along with the progress of the examination.

The data contained in this presentation is based on the results released on August 24, 2014, and it has already been published in the October 2014 issue of “Kagaku,” the monthly magazine by the Iwanami Shoten, Publishers. It has also been presented at the International Society for Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) Annual Conference, held in late August 2014, in Seattle.

The number of subjects who participated in the primary examination and its proportion in the target population were 41,813 (87.5%) for FY 2011, 139,209 (86.4%) for FY 2012, and 115,004 (73.0%) for FY 2013. The proportion of participants is significantly lower in FY 2013. This might be explained by the fact that, in Japan, high school graduates tend to leave hometown for employment or further education, resulting in quite a number of subjects in the age 16-18 group, at the time of March 11, 2011, failing to participate. This tendency has already been observed in the FY 2012 target regions, as shown by the number of participants by the age groups and its proportion in the target population. This means that, considering the experience in Chernobyl in three post-exposure years, when the incidence ratio was high in those who were in their teens at the start of exposure, there may have been a tendency to underestimate the number of thyroid cancer cases diagnosed in FY 2012 and FY 2013. From now on, as the target population ages, the participant proportion is expected to drastically drop after age 18. There is an immediate need to establish a means, other than screening, to diagnose and collect cases, such as the Hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) record booklet.

Although Fukushima Prefecture releases the number of confirmed cancer cases for each target year, the number of confirmed cancer cases by municipality is not announced. Below is the analysis of the cases suspected of cancer (FNAC-positive cases). At Fukushima Medical University where the majority of the surgeries are performed, Professor Shinichi Suzuki announced the positive predictive value of FNAC to be 90%. In reality, out of the 58 operated FNAC-positive cases of cancer so far, 57 cases were confirmed to be malignant tumors after post-surgical histological diagnosis (positive predictive value of 98.3%). This means considering suspected cancer　cases as a proxy of confirmed cancer cases would not induce so large a disease misclassification bias.

FY 2011 target areas were considered as one district. FY 2012 target areas were divided into 4 districts: Northern Nakadori (Fukushima City, etc.); Central Nakadori (Nihonmatsu City, Motomiya City, etc.); Koriyama City; and Southern Nakadori (Shirakawa City, etc.). FY 2013 target areas were divided into Iwaki City, Southeastern Fukushima Prefecture excluding Iwaki City, Western Fukushima Prefecture (Aizu region), and Northeastern Fukushima Prefecture (Soma region: Soma City and Sinchi Town). Thus Fukushima Prefecture was divided into 9 areas. Western Fukushima Prefecture was used as a reference for an internal comparison.

The number of detected cancer cases by FNAC, prevalence (x10000), the number of subjects per cancer case (the reciprocal of prevalence), incidence rate ratio by an external comparison and its 95% CI, and prevalence odds ratio by an internal comparison and its 95% confidence interval (CI) are shown as follows, respectively. FY 2011 areas: 14 cases, 3.3, 2,986.6 persons, 22.32 (12.92-37.23), and 1.21 (0.52-2.92). FY 2012 areas: Northern Nakadori—12 cases, 2.4, 4,221.8 persons, 15.79 (8.80-27.43), and 0.86 (0.36-2.11); Central Nakadori—11 cases, 6.1, 1,651.6 persons, 40.36 (21.12-72.71), and 2.19 (0.89-5.48); Koriyama City—23 cases, 4.3, 2,346.2 persons, 28.42 (18.43-42.44), and 1.54 (0.73-3.51); Southern Nakadori—8 cases, 4.9, 2,057.1 persons, 32.41 (15.25-64.09), and 1.76 (0.68-4.56). FY 2013 areas: Iwaki City—19 cases, 4.0, 2,513.6 persons, 26.52 (16.47-41.63), and 1.44 (0.66-3.34); Southeastern Fukushima Prefecture—7 cases, 2.5, 4,076.4 persons, 16.35 (7.67-33.50), and 0.89 (0.33-2.38); Western Fukushima Prefecture—9 cases, 2.8, 3,617.7 persons, 18.43 (9.13-35.42), and 1 (reference); Northeastern Fukushima Prefecture—0 case, 0, ∞, 0 (0.00-30.50), and 0 (not estimated).

In Chernobyl, the number of cases gradually began to increase, in both Belarus and Ukraine, in the first year after the accident. Furthermore, the screening of the unexposed populations in the same areas detected one thyroid cancer case in 70,445 persons from three studies. Also, U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) defines the minimum latency period for thyroid cancer to be 2.5 years for adults and 1 year for children. Therefore, the hypothesis that this outbreak of thyroid cancer is attributed to the nuclear accident can be supported. Given that WHO is also predicting an increase in thyroid cancer within Fukushima Prefecture, based on not just internal but external radiation exposure, we continue to propose the following: 1) consideration of evacuation planning and its implementation for, in descending order, pregnant women, infants, toddlers, children, adolescents, and women with potential to be pregnant; 2) postponement of the implementation of the plan to return residents to areas with the annual exposure dose of 20 mSv or less; 3) identifying cases in Fukushima residents age 19 and over at the time of the accident; 4) identifying cases in all age groups in prefectures neighboring Fukushima Prefecture, where the air dose levels are high; and 5) screening for non-thyroid cancers (solid and hematopoietic) as well as non-cancer illnesses and planning countermeasures.

^*Nakadori (literally meaning “middle street”) is a region, running from south to north, comprising the middle third of Fukushima Prefecture. Sandwiched between Aizu region to the west and Hamadori (“beach street”), Nakadori contains some of the largest cities in Fukushima Prefecture, such as Koriyama City and Fukushima City. Nakadori is about 40-80 km from FDNPP and received a significant amount of radioactive fallout after the accident, yet it was never evacuated.

Radiation risks at doses less than 100 mSv

Keith BAVERSTOCK

Abstract

Dose assessments by UNSCEAR indicate doses to the majority of the population living in fallout affected areas of Japan was less than 10 mSv effective dose in the first year and will not exceed 20 mSv over the next 80 years. However, if evacuated areas are re-populated when external effective dose rates fall to 20 mSv/year, effective doses considerably higher than UNSCEAR estimates will be incurred. While it is not the official policy of UNSCEAR that doses below 100 mSv carry no risk, the 100 mSv dose level has been adopted as a dose below which risk estimates are said to be sufficiently uncertain that risks below that level can be ignored. While it is the case that epidemiological risk estimation is technically more uncertain in the range 0 to 100 mSv, compared to 100 to 200 mSv, it is a fallacy to draw the conclusion that the risk/100 mSv is lower below, compared to above, the 100 mSv level.

I will examine the epidemiological evidence for the risks of exposures to less than 100 mSv and the theoretical arguments concerning risk at less than 100 mSv to show that a proposal that such exposures are “safe” is a political rather than a scientific decision and carries no legitimate scientific weight.